The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these international differences exist and of whether they tend to persist over time. However, a recent strand of research has shown that some progress on these issues can be made using the approach of the new political economy, which models regulation and its enforcement as the result of the balance of power between social and economic constituencies. In this paper we offer a first assessment of the results and potential of this approach in three fields: corporate finance, banking and securities markets.
Introduction
During the Great Depression, U.S. farmers oppressed by the rising burden of mortgages and by falling incomes successfully pressed their states' legislators to pass laws for debt moratoria of farm mortgages. To further support farmers' incomes, the Roosevelt administration devalued the dollar against gold, and abrogated all gold clauses in private debt contracts that would have otherwise triggered a wave of bankruptcies (Kroszner, 1998) . While relieving distressed farmers, the policy had adverse consequences for their further access to credit: in states which enacted farm foreclosure moratorium laws, banks extended fewer farm loans and charged higher interest rates (Alston, 1984) .
At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Great Depression prompted another form of political intervention. In Italy, the Fascist government launched a massive bailout of failing industrial firms and banks, and transferred the equity stakes acquired in the process to a public agency, the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI). Initially designed as a temporary remedy to the crisis, IRI grew into a state-run giant holding group that dominated the Italian economy for the rest of the century, and largely replaced securities markets in financing Italian heavy industry and utilities.
Political and social turmoil was also at the root of "codetermination", by which German employees select half of the supervisory board of large companies. This system, which had long-lasting implications for the governa nce of German companies, was initially introduced by a 1922 law of the Weimar Republic, in order to strike a compromise between the right and the left and achieve a minimal degree of political stability in a deeply divided country. Repealed under the Nazi regime, this arrangement was reinstated in 1951 for the Ruhr steel and coal industry by Konrad Adenauer.
Conscious of the tremendous political role played by the Ruhr industry in inter-war
Germany, he felt that democracy should be combined with constraints over the use of private capital, a notion labeled as "economic democracy". In 1976, the Codetermination Law extended equal representation of employees and shareholders to all companies with more than 2,000 employees. This arrangement, still in force in Germany, tends to shield management from the market for corporate control, by reinforcing employees' power to resist mergers or takeovers, and diminishes control over management by fractionalizing the supervisory board and making it a potential vehicle for collusion between managers and workers (Pistor, 1999) .
Political intervention in financial markets does not occur only at times of systemic crisis and social turmoil such as the Great Depression. The action of pressure groups and the career concerns of politicians often combine to produce specific political interventions in financial markets, such as nationalizations, privatizations, bailouts, vetoes to mergers and takeovers, etc. Consider the two following examples.
In 1976 six bankrupt U.S. railroad companies were nationalized with the creation of Conrail under the pressure of interest groups, formed by customers, existing claimants and employees, mostly located in the Northeast. After 11 years, Conrail was privatized.
Over this period, the U.S. government had outlays of $6.59 billion and received cash flow of $6.15 billion, implying an internal rate of return of -1.62 percent. During the period 1976-87, the major customers of the six bankrupt companies contributed over $14 million to both Democrats and Republicans and to key members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. The benefits to Conrail's customers amounted to over $2,774 million (Ang and Boyer, 2000) .
In March 1997, Krupp made a DM 15 billion hostile bid for Thyssen AG, a corporation previously trading at DM 12 billion on the Frankfurt stock exchange. The managers of the target company rallied politicians, workers' unions and media to its rescue, arguing that the raider intended to predate on the company and its workers to pay its shareholders. Thyssen's campaign was successful: Krupp withdrew its offer and agreed to a management-friendly merger later on, while the stock market value of Thyssen went back to DM 12 billion (Hellwig, 2000, p. 28) .
These examples illustrate that politics can interfere with financial markets in several ways. In recent years economists have developed a new approach to analyze systematically the impact of politics on the economy, treating policy-makers as selfinterested agents responding to political incentives. This approach, known as "new political economy", contrasts sharply with the view of policy-makers as "benevolent social planners", which was the maintained hypothesis of much economic analysis in the past. The political economy approach was initially applied to macroeconomic policy-making, but is now rapidly spreading to other areas of economic policy analysis.
In this paper we show how its tools and ideas can be applied to the analysis of policy interventions in financial markets, building on the first body of contributions in this field.
Which insights can we hope to get by applying the political economy approach to finance? First and foremost, we can hope to understand why often financial regulation is flawed and stifles -rather than fostering -the development of the markets to which it applies. In other words, it helps us to understand why some countries end up with "poorly designed" financial institutions or "poorly enforced" financial regulation.
Second, political economy can give us a clue as to when and why one can expect financial regulation or its enforcement to change over time. In other words, it guides us in the understanding of "financial reform" and of its feasibility. It does so by explaining which constituencies are sustaining a certain regulatory outcome, why they are currently dictating the rules, and how and why the balance of power can shift against them.
Thirdly, besides explaining how pressure groups affect regulation, political economy takes into account how in turn regulation shapes and entrenches political constituencies via its economic effects. In this sense, legal rules and economic outcomes are jointly determined, politics being the link between them. This interdependence is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 .
In Table 1 we indicate various ways through which politicians can interfere with financial markets. They can either change the "rules of the game" or intervene on a case-by-case basis. In both instances, political interventions can affect the financial decisions of corporations, the working of the banking industry, or the operation of security markets. The table also indicates relevant research, where available.
Each of the next three sections of the paper deals with one of the three types of interaction between politics and fina nce indicated in the columns of Table 1, which can serve as a road map for the reader. The table should not, however, be taken as a rigid and exhaustive classification. For instance, specific policy interventions can durably change the rules as perceived by the generality of market participants. If the government repeatedly bails out distressed banks, bank managers may come to regard this as a systematic policy and change their attitudes towards risk-taking accordingly. Similarly, public interventions in one area may have spillovers in other areas. For example, the protection of minority shareholders can affect not only corporate financial policies but also the development of securities markets, as we shall see in the next section.
Politics and Corporate Finance
Politics can affect the balance of power between company "insiders" (managers and controlling shareholders) and "outsiders" (non-controlling shareholders), in keeping with Hellwig's (2000) distinction. It does so by designing the rules intended to protect minority shareholders, as well as those that influence the contestability of corporate control. The State can have an even more direct influence over the life of companies by taking a direct stake in their ownership structure or by divesting from them, as it has happened with the recent worldwide privatization wave. In this section we analyze political interventions in all these areas.
Corporate governance
Recent contributions on corporate governance show that there are large differences in the degree of investor protection across countries and that these differences are correlated with both the development of capital markets and the ownership structure of firms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998) . These studies take the degree of investor protection as an exogenous variable. However, the legal rules setting the degree of shareholder protection are established via the political process, which in turn may respond to economic interests.
Some suggest that the political choices that determine the degree of investor protection are simply driven by ideological factors. For example, Roe (1999) argues that the differences between the corporate governance systems in the Unites States and in Continental Europe are due to the incompatibility of the American ideology with the kind of social democracy common in European countries. According to Roe, in Europe the State is entrusted with the task of sustaining a social pact between all classes, whereby greater equality is exchanged for reduced efficiency.
Political economy models depart from this view, since they regard political decisions as based on economic interests, not on ideology. The State is not considered as an independent player, but as an agent for political forces that r eflect the conflicting economic interests of their constituencies. By affecting the design of legal rules and their enforcement, the balance of power between political constituencies contributes to the allocation of control rights between the company's stakeholders -shareholders, managers, workers and possibly customers. The outcome of this balance of power and of the implied legislation then shapes the objective function of companies, determining the relative weights that they place on shareholder value, employees' welfare, protection of the environment, etc. (Tirole, 2001 ). Pagano and Volpin (2000) propose a political-economy model of the determinants of investor protection, where the relevant stakeholders are controlling shareholders, noncontrolling shareholders, and employees. In their model controlling shareholders ("entrepreneurs") want low investor protection to enjoy more private benefits of control, and may obtain it with the political support of workers. To win such support in electoral competitio n, they will have to make some concession to workers, that in the model takes the form of limiting their discretion in firing decisions. The feasibility of this "corporatist" agreement -or "stakeholder society", as others call it -depends on the political process and on the distribution of equity ownership in the economy.
If the political system favors the formation of party coalitions or if workers own little or no equity, entrepreneurs and workers will strike a political agreement whereby workers trade low shareholder protection for high job security. This agreement enables both social groups to preserve their rents. Low shareholder protection increases the entrepreneurs' private benefits of control, while high employee protection enables lowproductivity workers to extract rents from restructuring companies in the form of severance pay. If instead the political system does not favor the formation of coalitions or if workers' participation to the stock market is extensive, legislation will feature high shareholder protection and low employee protection.
These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence for OECD countries, where one observes two distinct clusters, as shown in Figure 2 . Continental European countries and Japan, whose governments are generally formed by coalitions and subject to a vote of confidence, have low investor and high employment protection. Conversely, Anglo-Saxon countries, whose political systems have the opposite features, have high investor and low employee protection. For five of the countries displayed in the Figure, this is confirmed by the results of a survey carried out on a sample of major corporations. Their executives were asked whether a company should pursue the interest of all stakeholders or give top priority to shareholders' interests (Allen and Gale, 2000) .
As shown in Table 2 , companies are to be managed in the interest of all stakeholders according to the overwhelming majority of Japanese, German and France respondents, and mainly in the interest of shareholders for most U.S. and U.K. respondents. This squares with the replies to another question posed in the same survey, concerning whether executives should give priority to dividend payments or to employment protection. The overwhelming majority of Japanese executives and most French and German executives answered that employment should be kept stable, even at cost of reducing dividends. In the U.S. and U.K., the pattern of replies was the opposite. Table 3 illustrates the relationship between "corporatism" and design of the political system. The table classifies OECD countries according to their degree of "corporatism", based on the two clusters in Figure 2 . 1 The table show that corporatist countries are also those where coalition governments are commonplace and where governments are subject to a confidence vote procedure.
Both in Japan and in some Continental European countries, the high degree of employee protection resulted from a political agreement struck in the immediate postwar period and reinforced by later legislation. This political agreement also tended to give employees a limited involvement in the direction of companies -the hallmark of a "corporatist" regime. In Japan, according to Gilson and Roe (1999) , lifetime employment grew out of a post-World War II political deal aimed at reducing labor unrest and restore entrepreneurs' control over factories. Similarly, in various European countries, the postwar period witnessed at the same time the introduction of increasing employment protection and various experiments with employee participation in corporate governance (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000) .
The model by Pagano and Volpin highlights that one of the potential costs of "corporatism" is under-investment or at least under-provision of external finance. To the extent that it leads management to extract high benefits of control and forsake shareholder value maximization, this social arrangement tends to produce an ex-ante inefficiency in the form of equity rationing: fearing that their cash flow rights will be diluted by management and by controlling shareholders, non-controlling shareholders will limit the availability of equity finance to companies, and thereby will constrain the size of the initial investment. Of course, this cost is particularly important to new companies, which still need to fund their investments, not to incumbent entrepreneurs for whom such cost is already largely sunk. This suggests that while established entrepreneurs may favor low shareholder protection, the opposite will be true for the 1 Corporatist countries are those for which employment protection exceeds 1.5 and shareholder protection is not larger than 4, and non-corporatist countries are the complement of this set.
owners of startup companies. Tirole (2001) highlights that under-investment is not the only cost of stakeholder capitalism. This arrangement may also hamper managerial effectiveness, due to deadlocks in decision-making and lack of clear mission for management. Roe (1994) and Bebchuck and Roe (1999) believe that competition will ensure a certain degree of convergence. Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) predict that national corporate law itself will tend to converge to a single standard. Coffee (1999) suggests that differences between corporate governance systems will persist, but that some functional convergence will occur. Gilson (2000) takes an eclectic stance, envisaging an interplay of functional convergence, convergence "by contract" and institutional persistence, with a range of different potential outcomes.
In contrast, Bebchuk and Roe (1999) question the idea of convergence towards an optimal and unified system of corporate governance, arguing, as just remarked, that political and economic forces condition the dynamics of corporate governance rules in different countries and generate path dependence. The same prediction arises from the model by Pagano and Volpin (2000) to the extent that people expect the current legal regime to persist over time. However, expectations about the future legal regime may change under the impact of exogenous increases in the diffusion of share ownership.
These can induce political support for improved shareholder protection, in turn enhancing more widespread share ownership. Examples of such exogenous shocks are privatization programs, the introduction of private pension funds, employee-stock ownership funds, or simply the spread of "equity culture".
Market for corporate control
The contestability of corporate control is an alternative way of limiting the "private benefits" of control that managers and controlling shareholders can extract at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. To a certain extent, an active market for corporate control can act as a substitute for shareholder protection in aligning managerial incentives with firm value maximization. By the same token, the political economy of takeover legislation resembles that of shareholder protection. Managers and controlling shareholders are naturally supportive of allowing poison pills and other antitakeover defenses in corporate charters, whereas non-controlling shareholders prefer banning or restricting such defenses, since they stand to gain from the contestability of control.
In this conflict, employees tend naturally to side with the incumbent management and controlling shareholders, since a takeover generally endangers the stability of their employment or at least threatens the salary and the power that they have secured within the company's hierarchy. Therefore an additional feature of a "corporatist" arrangement will generally be a restrictive takeover code. However, even in a non-corporatist country such as the United States, political pressure by managers and employees restricted takeover activity in the last decade. Following the large wave of hostile takeovers and restructuring activity of the 1980s, when almost half of major U.S. corporations received a takeover offer, "managers … fought takeovers with legal maneuvers and by enlisting political and popular support. They were successful in that hostile takeovers became more costly in the 1990s" (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, p. 122) .
Besides coalescing at the political level to promote restrictive takeover legislation, managers and workers are natural allies in opposing the contestability of control at the company level, when a specific takeover threat materializes. Pagano and Volpin (2001) show that the incumbent management can effectively use employees as "white squires" against hostile takeovers, as in the attempted 1997 takeover of Thyssen by Krupp described in the introduction of this paper. 2 In the ir model, workers prefer dealing with the incumbent manager than with a raider because the manager is more lenient in his monitoring policy and therefore ends up paying higher salaries to motivate workers. The manager's private benefit is his own "easy life", in the sense that by being lenient he avoids the costs of monitoring workers intensively. In equilibrium, the workers' expected wages are increasing in the management's private benefits, and both are inversely related to the success probability of the takeover.
The equity stake that management holds in the company is a key parameter in the model: owning a higher stake tends to align the managers' objectives to shareholder value maximization, and therefore makes them more willing to accept the contestability of control over the company. This situation seems to fit well with the more accommodating view that recently U.S. corporate managers have taken towards takeovers relative to the past: "Thanks to lucrative stock option plans, managers could share in the market returns from restructured companies. Shareholder value became an ally rather than an enemy" (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001, p. 122) .
Workers' wage demands are more easily accommodated in companies where managers' private benefits are larger for two reasons other than that just highlighted.
First, conceding long-term labor contracts with high salaries to workers protects managerial rents from the market for corporate control. Such wage concessions work as a "poison pill", by reducing the firm's attractiveness for a raider. Second, the larger the private benefits that managers can extract from the company they run, the softer they will tend to be in wage negotiations with workers. Insofar as workers can hold up management by threatening disruptive industrial action, they act like "greenmailers", that is, like unwanted shareholders requiring a premium to sell their shares.
These models of corporate stakeholders' behavior highlight that whenever low shareholder protection allows the extraction of control rents from a company, workers and managers become natural allies in sharing such rents. This provides an additional reason, at the level of the individual company, why managers and workers might vote jointly in favor of low shareholder protection or of control-sharing arrangements such as codetermination.
Public Ownership of Companies
In the last twenty years, the governments of many countries have carried out largescale privatization programs that have deeply changed the functioning of formerly stateowned corporations and that of financial markets at large. Privatizations have generally been driven by the objective to retire government debt or reduce its growth, to increase the efficiency of state-owned corporations and to promote competition in formerly monopolistic sectors of the economy such as utilities (Megginson and Netter, 2000) . Biais and Perotti (2001) have suggested that privatization programs may also have served a political purpose, in the sense that allocating a significant amount of sha res to median class voters can help a conservative policy-maker steer them in favor of more conservative policies. "This is not the result of gratitude: rather, their shareholdings make them averse to elect politicians whose redistributive policies would reduce the value of their investment" (p. 2). Since median voters are generally not wealthy, however, they will not be inclined to buy a significant amount of shares in privatized companies unless these are offered at a large discount. Germany or in imperial Japan.
However, the European dirigiste response was not without efficiency costs, at least in the long run. State control of companies and banks ge nerated soft budget constraints for managers, with the implied agency problems, and offered to politicians the opportunity to extract large rents. These inefficiencies were reflected into growing public debt, which eventually required privatization as one of the remedies.
The remaining question is why privatizations had to wait as long as the end of the 20 th century -why, in other words, the cumulative effects of the inefficiencies of State control on public debt was to become so large before corrective action was taken. The political economy literature may be helpful also in this respect. In macroeconomics, it has shed light on the timing and delay of monetary and fiscal stabilizations by modeling the political conflict over the sharing of the burden of reform, as in the "war of attrition" models described by Drazen (2000) .
Politics and Banking
Banking regulation is another arena in which political factors can play a role. A major source of conflict is that between large and small banks, who may be affected in opposite ways by the implied changes in banking competition. Another area of conflict is the balance between the protection of creditor rights and that of debtor interests in the design of bankruptcy law and in the choice to concede moratoria or bail out insolvent borrowers or banks. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) have shown that the timing of the deregulation of bank branching across the United States has been determined by the relative strength of the interests groups affected by the reform. The groups that obviously stood to benefit from branching deregulation were the large banks, who could readily expand across state boundaries, and customers who are dependent on bank finance. Accordingly, deregulation occurred earlier in states where small banks were relatively less prominent in number and financial strength, and where companies were smaller and therefore more dependent on bank finance. The pattern of deregulation had a first-order impact on the level of economic activity across the States, as persuasively shown by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) .
Branching restrictions and deposit insurance
Interest group variables also explain the voting pattern of legislators in the U.S.
House of Representatives on banking reform at the federal level. Kroszner and Strahan (2000) extend this type of analysis to the vote by individual legislators on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. They show that votes were affected by private interest group factors, reflecting the contrasting interests of large versus small banks, and of banks versus insurance companies.
Bankruptcy law, bailouts and moratoria
Bankuptcy law has to tread a difficult balance between the protection of creditors, to promote the availability and cheap provision of credit, and the protection of debtors against debt overhang and excessive liquidation of collateral. A strong legal protection of creditors may be efficient ex ante, but creates inefficiencies ex post. For instance, it may exacerbate debt overhang problems. When any income earned after default must go to creditors, a debtor has little incentive to work, or, at least, to do any work that is legal. Other ex-post inefficiencies may be associated with collateral liquidation. Being more interested in recovering their money than in the overall company's value, holders of collateral may strip the company of key assets and force its inefficient liquidation.
Moreover, the liquidation of a firm can have negative externalities for third parties: for instance, it may inflict costs on employees who have invested in firm-specific human capital, or on suppliers or customers who have come to depend on the firm's operation. Biais and Recasens (2001) argue that the socially optimal degree of creditor protection balances the ex-post inefficiencies of frequent firms' liquidation, including its diffused social costs, with the ex-ante efficiency gains (especially more abundant credit) associated with strong creditor protection. They analyze how bankruptcy laws emerging from the political process can deviate from this social optimum, as each constituency fail to internalize the external effects of the law on the other constituencies.
The poorest citizens favor a soft bankruptcy law, which reduces the social costs of liquidatio n, while upwardly mobile middle-class citizens vote for a tough law, which improves their access to credit.
The balance between the ex ante inefficiency and the ex post efficiency of debtorfriendly laws is present also in the analysis of debt moratoria. These have been at times introduced by law for sectors of the economy or the generality of borrowers: an example was the farm foreclosure moratorium approved by U.S. legislators in the 1930s. In some cases, such politically induced changes in the laws can be beneficial insofar as they "complete" private contracts. For instance, a loan contract may fail to specify what will happen if a bad harvest or a natural disaster hits the economy, making it very hard for borrowers to repay. Such a shock can, however, create a political majority in favor of a debt moratorium or of a bailout of insolvent borrowers. One may think that to secure the implied ex-post efficiency gain, society is bound to incur an ex-ante efficiency loss:
anticipating this potential political i ntervention, creditors will be less willing to lend.
While in certain cases this ex-ante efficiency loss may arise, Bolton and Rosenthal (1999) show that this need not be the case. They propose a model where, in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, polit ical intervention raises both ex-ante and ex-post efficiency, while bailouts do not affect the ex-ante equilibrium and raise efficiency ex post. These surprising results derive from the fact that in their model political intervention occurs specifically in the contingencies that private contracts are unable to foresee.
Politics and Securities Markets
According to Rajan and Zingales (2001) , the historical development of securities markets has not followed a monotonic path, but has features accelerations and retreats.
Based on the analysis of data for 24 countries for the most of the 20 th century, they argue that politics -as driven by special-interest groups representing established business -can explain this uneven evolution of capital markets. Incumbents oppose financial development because it produces fewer benefits for them than for potential competitors. Incumbents can finance investment opportunities mainly with retained earnings, while potential competitors need external capital to start up.
However, the incumbents' opposition to financial development weakens when they face extraordinary opportunities to grow, especially abroad. In these instances, even established business pressures politicians to open product and financial markets to foreign competition. Once markets are open to foreign competition, it becomes unprofitable for incumbents to insist on keeping an under-developed capital market. The prediction is that the overhaul of securities markets regulation is part and parcel of a transition to free trade.
Insider trading code and information disclosure
Rajan and Zingales do not indicate which specific reforms of securities market regulation are associated with "financial development". However, the literature on market microstructure suggests that well-functioning securities markets require regulation that minimizes the information asymmetries between market participants: the repression of insider trading and the timely disclosure and dissemination of information by publicly traded companies can reduce adverse selection problems in securities markets. To the extent that adverse selection generates gain to informed speculators and inflicts losses on uninformed investors, the latter require an ex ante discount on the price of securities when these are issued. Equivalently, adverse selection in securities markets translates into a higher cost of external capital for companies. Recent evidence by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2001) supports this prediction of the theory and underscores the importance of the enforcement of insider trading regulations, rather than their mere existence. They find that the cost of equity (after controlling for risk factors, a liquidity factor, and other shareholder rights) is reduced by about 5% if insider trading laws are enforced.
Why don't all countries then enforce insider trading regulation with equal strictness?
Again, political economy may provide the answer. For established companies, the cost of equity capital is a mainly a sunk cost, since they already raised most of the external finance they need and can rely on a steady flow of retained earnings to fund new investment. In addition, the managers and controlling shareholders of existing companies may profit from insider trading opportunities, if the law is lax. In contrast, startup companies need a substantial infusion of external finance, so that for them the cost of equity capital is critical to their viability and growth. Established business will therefore tend to favor lax insider trading rules and weak enforcement, whereas potential entrants and shareholders at large will prefer strict rules and tough enforcement. This divergence of interests parallels the contrast between incumbents and new entrepreneurs on the issue of shareholder protection mentioned in section 2.1.
An interesting case study on the importance of securities market regulation is provided by Johnson and Shleifer (2000) , who compare the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. In Poland, stringent securities markets rules were imposed and strict enforced by an independent securities surveillance commission, whereas in the Czech Republic regulations were lax and loosely enforced. Correspondingly, in Poland the stock market developed rapidly, whereas in the Czech Republic it lingered in a state of underdevelopment, with low liquidity, few company listings and infrequent equity issues. According to Johnson and Republic were arguably shaped by ideological differences between the two governments," with the Czech government favoring a "hands-off approach" and the Polish authorities preferring a more strictly regulated marketplace. In our view, it remains an open issue if these two different ideological approaches were not dictated by the different power of pre-existing pressure groups (the "incumbents", in Rajan and
Zingales' terminology) in the two countries. For instance, it is well known that Czech banks were already quite powerful at the time of the introduction of the reforms: they may have used their power to prevent the development of securities markets to avoid competition.
Design of government debt auctions
Starting in the early 1980s, many governments have redesigned the primary market for public debt issues, by replacing with auctions the traditional placement of securities with banks. At the same time, these governments created a primary dealer system in which specially designated dealers have the exclusive right to bid directly in the auction and then distribute the securities to investors. According to Kroszner (1998) , these reforms of the primary market for government securities have carefully balanced the need to lower the issuance cost of public debt for the increasingly indebted governments and the vested interests of pre-existing financial intermediaries. "While the general outline of the reforms may have been motivated by a desire to reduce issuing costs, the specific procedures, such as the choice of auction technique, seem to be driven by other factors. Some institutional reforms, which appear to provide rents to the large banks and primary dealers, indicate evidence of regulatory capture of the Treasury by the dealers".
Conclusions
In this paper we review the main insights that the political economy approach has so far contributed to our understanding of financial regulation. On the whole, this approach can help us understand existing international differences in financial regulation. It can also help us predic t future changes in regulation and in its enforcement, by revealing the decision process through which financial reforms are designed and implemented and the way in which political constituencies affect policy. By the same token, using this approach one can identify instances in which reform is not possible, because the existing regulatory regime has entrenched interest groups who can veto reform.
Understanding the determinants of financial regulation is important because regulatory design and enforcement activity affect the development of capital markets and thereby economic growth, as shown by the extensive empirical literature on finance and growth (see Beck, Levine and Loayaza (2000) , Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Zingales (1998), and Carlin and Mayer (1999) , among others).
Having outlined the insights that the political economy of finance can yield, it is also fair to expose the likely limitations of this approach. One limitation is that these models reduce the set of variables that can be considered truly exogenous, precisely because they endogeneize institutional features that in the past were often taken as exogenous.
This reduces the set of predictions that these models are able to produce, a problem sometimes compounded by the existence of multiple equilibria. A second limitation of this approach is that empirically it is often difficult to discriminate between ideological (or cultural) and economic determinants of political choices. According to the political economy approach, only the latter should affect political decisions, but it is hard to rule out that ideology and culture may also play a role in shaping financial architecture. 
Regulation
Protection of minority shareholders (Pagano and Volpin, 2000) Codetermination (Pistor, 1999) Takeover restrictions (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001) Branching restrictions (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) Bank supervision (Kroszner and Strahan, 2000) Generalized moratoria and bailouts (Bolton and Rosenthal, 1999; Kroszner, 1999) Bankruptcy code (Biais and Recasens, 2001) Deposit insurance
Insider trading code Design of government debt auctions (Kroszner, 1998) Information disclosure for public companies (Johnson and Shleifer, 2000) Opening to foreign competition (Rajan and Zingales, 2000) 
Specific interventions
Takeover prevention (Hellwig, 2000) Privatization (Biais and Perotti, 2001) Individual bank bailouts or closures Individual company bailouts (Ang and Boyer, 1999) Enforcement of security markets regulation Table 2 .
Preferences about Corporate Objectives
The table reports the results of a survey carried out on senior managers in a sample of major companies. The alternative answers to the first question were: "A company exists for the interest of all stakeholders" and "Shareholders' interest should be given the first priority". The alternative answers to the second question were: "Executives should maintain dividend payments, even if they must lay off a number of employees" and "Executives should maintain stable employment, even if they must reduce dividends". Source: Allen and Gale (2000) 
Coalition Government and Corporatism
Coalition Government is the fraction of years in which a given country had coalition governments in the period from 1975 (with the following exceptions due to data availability: Australia and Finland, 1976; Germany and Portugal, 1977; Spain, 1978) to 1997. Confidence Vote is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in countries where the government must resign if it loses a confidence vote, and 0 otherwise. For Canada and New Zealand, it is set equal to 0 because their government could be forced to resign upon losing a confidence vote only if it is a minority government, a historically rare occurrence in both countries. Corporatist Country is a dummy variable based on the Employment Protection and Shareholder Protection data displayed in Figure 2 . It equals 1 if Employment Protection is not smaller than 1.5 and Shareholder Protection is not larger than 4, and 0 if Employment Protection is larger than 1.5 and Shareholder Protection is not smaller than 4. Source: Pagano and Volpin (2000) , Tables 1 and 2 
